Title: The Equivalence of Political and Economic Allocations
Author: P.G. Monateri
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to analyse what does it
happen when we introduce “violence”, threats and self-help, into
economic models. This will be done considering the alternative between a
market or a political allocation. The conclusions will be:
a) That under standard assumptions there is no difference between a market allocation and a political allocation; and so that there is no inner superiority in a market allocation in comparison with a political one.
b) That if we move away from these standard assumptions, then the only real economic problem becomes a “political” problem, and that there cannot be efficient conclusions which are independent from an initial allocation of force and resources.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
Keywords:
Law and Economics, Economic Allocation, Property Rights, Violence,
Blackmail, Political, Coase, International Relations, Efficiency, Social
Cost.a) That under standard assumptions there is no difference between a market allocation and a political allocation; and so that there is no inner superiority in a market allocation in comparison with a political one.
b) That if we move away from these standard assumptions, then the only real economic problem becomes a “political” problem, and that there cannot be efficient conclusions which are independent from an initial allocation of force and resources.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 10
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